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THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE
IN THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS: LIABILITY
OF OFFICER FOR ACTION OR NONAOTION*
OLIVER P. FIELD
INTRODUCTORY

The question of the liability of an officer for acting or failing
to act under an unconstitutional statute may arise in a variety of
situations.
I. Injunctive relief is often sought to prevent an officer from
taking threatened action under a statute which is alleged to be
invalid. If the court decides that the law is unconstitutional the
decree will issue, and such a suit is not one against the state because the officer is being restrained in his private instead of in his
official capacity. He is said to be stripped of his official charac.
ter, and for that reason is subject to injunctive restraint.,
*This is one of a series of articles on the effect of an unconstitutional statute written while the author was a Sterling Fellow at Yale University School of
Law, under the direction of Professor Walter F. Dodd. The writer is also indebted to Professor Edwin M. Borchard for suggestions as to the form and content of this paper.
"Astrom v. Hammond, Fed. Cas. No. 596 (C. C. Mich. 1842); Commissioners of Wyandotte County.v. Kansas City, Ft. Scott & Memphis I. R, 5 Kan.
App. 43, 47 Pac. 326 (1896) ; Lynn v. Polk, 8 Lea 121 (Tenn. 1881) ; Board of
Liquidation v. McComb, 9z U. S. 531 (1875); see 4 PoMEROY, EQUT JURISPRvDENCE (4th ed. I919) § i8ig.
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2. A writ of mandamus may be asked for by a private individual to compel the performance of some act which the officer
asserts is thrust upon him by an unconstitutional statute. The
question whether the officer may set this up as a defence is a
troublesome one, and the courts are divided upon the answer
which should be given to it.2 Some courts refuse to permit the
unconstitutionality of the statute to be used as a defence, and will
issue the writ if the relator makes out a case which otherwise
entitles him to it.
3. The state may bring a criminal action against the officer
for failing to perform some duty with the performance of which
he is charged by statute, the nonperformance of which is by the
same or another statute made a criminal offence. State v. Godwin 3 was a case of this type. There an indictment was returned
against a justice of the peace for failing to make a report required
by statute, an omission in the makink of which constituted a statutory crime. A subsequent statute purported to relieve the justice of the peace from the performance of this duty and to provide
for its performance by another officer. This second statute
turned out to be unconstitutional. The justice was then indicted
for his omission to make the report. The theory of the indictment was that the second statute, being unconstitutional, had no
effect in transferring the duty to make the report referred to, nor
did it affect the duty of the justice to make it. The court decided
that the justice was not guilty. The opinion emphasizes the presumption that a statute is valid until it is declared invalid. This
presumption should protect the officer as well as insure for the
statute the benefit of any doubts which the court might entertain
as to its constitutionality. The decision was also influenced by
the manifest injustice of requiring that the justice of the peace be
wiser than the legislature and the people, with respect to the possible unconstitutionality of a statute. To fine an officer for obey'State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, i49 Wis. 488, 137 N. W. 2o (1912) ;
Bd. of Commrs. of Newton County v. State, I61 Ind. 616, 69 N. E. 442 (19o4).
For a discussion of this question, with citations of cases pro and con, and a
consideration of the reasons for decision advanced by the courts, see Rapacz,
Protectiont of Officers Who Act Under Uncotnstitutional Statutes (i927) II
MiNe. L. RPv. 58s.
3 23 N. C. 697, 31 S. E. 22r (x898).
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ing what appeared to be the law seemed too illogical a result for
the court to reach. A strict adherence to the void abt initio
theory 4 might have led to a contrary decision, but this case illustrates that that doctrine will not be applied to its logical conclusion in a case of a criminal prosecutior of an officer for failing
to perform his duty, the officer having been relieved of the duty
by what turned out to be an invalid art.
4. An action for damages may be brought against an officer
who acts under an unconstitutional statute, by a party claiming to
have been injured thereby. A similar action may also be instituted against the officer by a private individual who alleges that
he has been injured by a refusal of the officer to take certain action
under a statute which the officer believes to be unconstitutional.
In one of the senses in which the term liability is used it is
perhaps correct to say that the officer is liable in the first three
situations just considered, to a suit for an injunction, to a proceeding in mandamus, or to criminal prosecution. The term liability
as used in this study is, however, more narrowly confined in its
meaning. By it is meant liability to an action for money damages,
such as was mentioned in the fourth group of cases alluded to
above.
In considering the cases on the effect of an unconstitutional
statute on the liability of an officer, three types of situations are
easily distinguishable:
(i) Cases in which an action is brought because of a
refusal of the officer to act.
(2) Cases of direct action by the officer, in the absence
of an intervening judicial process.
(3) Cases involving judicial process or judicial proceedings.
The problem of the protection of officers acting under invalid
statutes will be considered subsequent to a review of the cases.
'The phrase void ab inhito as used here refers to the view taken by some
courts that an unconstitutional statute should be entirely eliminated in the
decision of a case.
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Unless expressly stated that the contrary is the case all of the situations discussed in this paper involve official action or nonaction
under an unconstitutional statute or ordinance. 5
I. REFUSAL TO ACT
In Clark v. Miller6 a road had been laid over the plaintiff's
land. The first assessment of damages was $i85. On reassessment this was raised to $355. The defendant, a town supervisor,
presented the amount of the first assessment to the board for
allowance, refusing to present the claim for $355 on the ground
that the statute under which the reassessment had been held was
unconstitutional. The plaintiff refused to accept the award of
$185 and brought an action against the supervisor for refusing
to present the reassessment figure to the board. The supervisor
defended with the plea that he was under no duty to act in
accordance with a statute which he believed to be unconstitutional.
The court held for the plaintiff, allowing a recovery of $355. In
sustaining this decision the court said, in the course of its opinion,
that "honest ignorance does not excuse a public officer for disobedience to the law." 7 Disobedience in such a case was said to
be at the peril of the officer, and inasmuch as the plaintiff had
an interest in the performance of this function he was entitled to
recover what he had lost by the refusal of the supervisor to perform the same. The' attitude of the court is set out in the following quotation from the opinion:
"That the defendant thought the law unconstitutional,
and that this view was shared by the town officers, and that
his refusal to obey the statute went upon that ground, is, in
a legal point of view, of no consequence." 8
r An officer is of course liable for action taken in the absence of a statute
when such action is contrary to a constitutional prohibition which operates upon
individuals. Robinson v. Bishop, 39 Hun 37o (N. Y. 1886) (liable on bond is-

sued in excess of constitutional authority); Milligan v. Hovey, Fed. Cas. No.
9,6o5 (C. C. Ind. z87i) (General Hovey, in the famous Milligan case of the
Civil War period, held liable for false imprisonment, in exceeding his conhstitutional authority).
a54 N. Y. 528 (1874).
78 bid. 534.
Ibid. 532.
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The court said further:
"In my opinion it ought to be deemed settled in the law
of this State that a ministerial officer, charged by statute
with an absolute and certain duty, in the performance of
which an individual has a special interest, is liable to an action
if he refuses and omits to perform it." 9
With respect to the amount of recovery; counsel contended
that interest only should be allowed, and that only for the period
until the claim could again be presented and allowed. The court
held, however, that the gist of the wrong was the refusal to present the claim for $355. Therefore that amount with interest
should constitute the amount of the judgment. On the question
of damages the court said:
"In respect to the rule of damages, I have no doubt that
the defendant is answerable for the whole amount which, by
his refusal to perform his duty, the plaintiff has been unable
to obtain. The law will not limit his recovery to anything
less than the amount of the reassessment; for such a limit
would drive him to a succession of actions, in none of which
could he, if the defendant's position is correct, recover more
than interest. It cannot be assumed that the defendant
would be taught by the result of one action and proceed to
do his duty, and thus avoid another. The plaintiff is not
thus to be put off. The defendant's misconduct has deprived
him of obtaining his money, and the defendant must answer
to the whole injury which he has occasioned." '0
One cannot but feel that the court makes an insufficient allowance
for the respect usually accorded its judgments, when it says that
it cannot be assumed that the defendant would be taught b the
result of one action. Is that not exactly what one would reasonably expect: that the defendant would learn by one action and
guide his behavior accordingly?
In Morris v. People:"-a New York statute provided for a
penalty of $250 for refusal on the part of members of the board
9lMd.

534.

" Ibid. 535.

'3 Den1o 381 (N. Y. 1846). The majority opinion was delivered by Senator Lott.
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of supervisors to audit claims against the county. A claim for
salary was presented to the board by a person purporting to be
a judge in the county. The state legislature had provided that
the judge's salary should be a charge against the county. The
defefidants, as members of the board of supervisors, refused to
audit the claim. They alleged that the court of which the plaintiff claimed to be judge had been created by an unconstitutional
statute. They concluded from this that he was not entitled
to his salary and asserted that the statute making the salary
in question a charge upon the county was unconstitutional because it in effect appropriated public money for a private purpose. In an action of debt brought by the prosecuting attorney
at the instance of the person claiming to be judge, to recover
the penalty of $25o, the court held that the defendant supervisors
were liable. The court admitted that the statute creating the
court was defective, but held that the legislature could nevertheless provide for the payment of services performed as judge. To
do so was not, said the court, diverting public money to a private
use.
In Norwood v. Goldsmith' 2 the treasurer of a county refused
to pay a warrant that had been drawn for the repayment .of taxes
which were alleged to have been paid under an unconstitutional
statute. In the opinion of the treasurer the statute under which
the taxes had been paid was constitutional. A board of commissioners to whom the claim had been presented thought differently, however, and allowed the claim. No court had declared
the statute to be either constitutional or unconstitutional. Following an ineffectual application for a writ of mandamus, the
plaintiff, as holder of the warrant, brought a statutory action
against the treasurer and his sureties, under a statute authorizing
judgment for the amount of the claim if its payment had been
refused. The court found for the plaintiff. In answer to the
argument that a proper proceeding should first have been instituted
to have the statute declared invalid, the court said that the treasurer had passed on its constitutionality in refusing payment of
the warrant, and the board had passed on the same question when
12x68 Ala. 2,

53 So. 84 (igro).
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they allowed the claim, and the two judgments being in opposition
to each other this was a proper proceeding in which to settle the
matter.
The view of the court with respect to the privilege of an
officer to pass upon the unconstitutionality of a statute is well
expressed in the following statement:
"All persons or officers are of necessity required to pass
upon the validity of all acts or proposed statutes under which
they are required to act or to decline to act. In so acting or
declining to act under such proposed statute he must necessarily pass upon it for himself. He may do so with or without advice from attorneys or other sources of information.
But courts are the one source from which he can get no information, in advance, as to whether he should, in any particular
instance, observe or decline to observe the requirements of
the proposed act or statfite. Every executive officer, or
every person as for that matter, is presumed to know the
law-a presumption often violent but always necessary.
Hence, every man is his own constructionist. If two differ
as to the construction of a given act, and it is acted upon or
declined to be acted upon by the one, to the hurt or injury of
the other, and the one is sued in the courts by the other for
so acting or declining to act, and in the decision of the cause
it becomes necessary to pass upon the validity of the act in
order to determine the rights of the parties in that suit, the
court will then-but not until then-pass upon the constitutionality of the act; and it is then only passed upon by the
court in so far as the rights of these particular parties to the
particular suit are concerned. When so decided by the
highest court of the land all people, including executive and
judicial officers, ought and usually do consider that particular
question as settled and binding; but this is only so by the
rules of policy, propriety, and common consent, and the
credence which the people have in the opinions of such
courts., 13
"Ibid.-234, 53 So. at 87; cf. Sessums v. Botts, 34 Tex. 335 (1870). The
court in that case said, at 349: "We are not willing to indorse the proposition,

in its broadest sense, that a ministerial officer has the right or power to decide
upon the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of an act passed with all the
formality of law. It is the duty of such officers to execute and not to pass
judgment upon the law, and we are of the opinion that the clerk of the district court should have refused to issue execution in violation of what appeared to be a valid and binding law, until the same had been declared void
by the tribunal properly constituted for that purpose."
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It is difficult to reconcile some other portions of the opinion
rendered by Justice Mayfield with the views expressed in this
quotation. The court adopted without qualification the sweeping
dictum of Justice Field in the case of Norton v. Shelby County,'4
stating that an unconstitutional statute is exactly as though it had
never been enacted.
Norwood v. Goldsmith"" and Clark v. Miller'0 are distinguishable on this ground: that in the former a statutory action was
involved, while in the latter a common law action was permitted.
In the former case the officer was subject to the penalty because
of the statute, as interpreted by the court. In the latter the court
arrived at the same conclusion in the absence of statute. One may
well question the wisdom of interpreting a statute, such as that
involved in the Norwood case, to cover a refusal to pay a warrant because of doubt as to the constitutionality of the statute
which purported to authorize the claim for which the warrant
was issued. Suppose that Goldsmith had paid out the money on
the warrant and that subsequently the county had brought an
action against him to recover it. Could the treasurer defend by
saying that he paid the warrant because he thought that it was
his duty to do so, although he admitted private doubts with
respect to its constitutionality? The DeclaratoryJudgment Act
would be available to permit the parties to obtain a judicial decree settling the question if it were in force, and such a case as
this illustrates the need for such an act.' 7 The treasurer, on one
side, and the warrant holder on the other, could have litigated
the matter so that the former would have been protected, and
the latter would, as a.result, have obtained his money, if he was
entitled to it.
In considering the justice of the results of the Norwood and
Clark cases the possible use of the writ of mandamus must be
taken into account. The Alabama court denied an application for
a writ of mandamus in the Norwood case, on the ground that a
i18U.

S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. ii2 (886).

Supra note 12.
Supra note 6.
has no declaratory judgment act at the present time.

'Alabama
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legal remedy was available in the form of the statutory action
which was subsequently brought, and which has just been considered.18 The cases are not agreed that the exist&ce of a statutory
action is sufficient to bar the application for the writ, although if
the action is summary and effective the tendency would perhaps be
to deny the application."9
In Clark z. Miller2 0 the case is more difficult with respect to
mandamus. The writ will not issue in most cases unless there has
been a default, and in this case the supervisor could not be said
to be in default until the time for presenting the claim had passed.
To have obtained the writ after the adjournment of the board
would have been fruitless. There is authority for the view that
in exceptional cases mandamus will issue even though the time for
performance has not yet arrived. 1 A common law action for
damages is hardly to be considered in the same class as the statutory action in the Norwood case; the former being much more
slow and inconvenient. For that reason it might well have been
held, in Clark v. Miller, that not only was the legal remedy so
ineffective that the writ would issue in the discretion of the court,
but also, that it would issue notwithstanding that the time for "
performance had not yet arrived. No application for a mandamus seems to have been made in the case, but counsel contended
that it, rather than the common law action, should have been
brought. In disapproving of this contention the court made the
following observation:
"That remedy exists, in general, only where the law
affords no other, to prevent a failure of justice. But, as we
have seen, in this case the plaintiff makes out a right to his
action at law, and in such cases it can never be necessary to
resort to a mandamus, even if that remedy happens to be
legally available. In this case that remedy would not have
been available to the plaintiff and effectual to procure payment of his claim. It could not have been applied for until
the defendant was in default; and that default could not have
"State ex rel. Norwood v. Goldsmith, 162 Ala. 171, 50 So. 394 (1909).
"38 C. J. 568; 18 R. C. L. i36.
"'Supra note 6.
People ex rel.Hotchkiss v. Smith, 2o6 N. Y. 231, 99 N. E. s68 (iqi9);
see 18 P. C. L. 122; 38 C. J. 581.
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been ascertained to exist until the last moment for presenting
claims for audit That late period would have rendered an
application for a mandamus, if granted, practically ineffectual to afford the plaintiff the relief he was entitled to." 22
The opinion of the court leaves unanswered the question whether
mandamus would be denied because of the existence of a legal
remedy or whether a legal remedy should be denied because of
the existence of the remedy of mandamus. The court seems to
have reasoned that legal relief should be permitted because of the
fact that mandamus was not available. The possible use of mandamus in cases involving questions of constitutionality will be
considered in a subsequent section.
These two cases serve to indicate that the officer acts at his
peril in refusing to perform functions in accordance with statutory requirements. If the statute turns out to be unconstitutional
he is safe. If it turns out tq be constitutional he is liable to an
action for damages. On the other hand, as will be shown. in a
subsequent section, the officer may not safely rely on a statute in
the performance of the functions enjoined upon him by it.
In State ex rel.Ballardv. Goodland2 3 an officer was removed
from office for refusing to levy a tax in accordance with a statute
which he believed to be unconstitutional. Later the statute was
declared unconstitutional and the order of removal was reversed
on appeal. The removal in this case was not construed to be an
administrative act, but, due to the phraseology of the statute, was
held to be a quasi-judicial act. The law having been declared
unconstitutional the sole ground for removal failed, because "an
unconstitutional law imposes no enforceable legal duty, but the
duties of the office remained defined by existing valid laws and as
if such unconstitutional law had never been enacted." 24 The
court applied the void a&initio view of the effect of an unconstitutional statute and by so doing reached the proper result. This
2 Clark v. Miller, 54 N. Y. 528, 534 (1874).

There is some conflict on this

point, however, and the courts seem to have considerable discretion in refus-

ing or granting the writ, in cases in which an action for damages would lie,
on the ground that it is often an inadequate remedy, and not sufficiently specific
to do justice. See cases collated in 38 C. J. 563; 18 P, C. L. 133.
=Ibid.Wis.
395,393,
i5o150
N. W.N.
at W.
48.9.488 (1915).
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case illustrates that there are situations to which this theory should
be applicable, although the number of such situations is small.
Members of a board of registrars who refuse to register a
person as a voter, basing their refusal on an unconstitutional statute, are liable in an action in tort.2 5 If the statute existing prior
to the enactment of the unconstitutional law upon which the
officers rely provides for the imposition of a penalty in cases of
discrimination against an eligible voter, such a statute constitutes
the basis for recovery. 26 The right to vote is more highly prized
in these cases than the size of the vote in most elections would
lead one to expect.
The cases considered in this section illustrate the severity
with which officers have in the past been dealt, for refusing to act
because they guessed that a statute was unconstitutional when it
was not. It may be that the courts of today would be more
lenient than those of the past century, but modem cases on this
problem are rare. This is due to the development of methods of
preventive justice, and to the fact that in the greater number of
cases involving official action and nonaction amicable -settlements
or suits are possible. These suits, if settlement without a suit is
either impossible or undesirable, usually take the form of an application for a mandamus or injunction, as the case may be. For
these reasons suits against the officer for damages are at the present time relatively infrequent.
In all of these cases involving official responsibility for action
or nonaction under an unconstitutional statute the courts are faced
with the problem of determining where the cost of legislative
error shall be placed. Shall the citizen or the officer suffer? In
the cases involving refusal to act the courts have chosen to hold
the officer more often than the citizen.
I Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497, 11 N. E. !z6 (887). The court said,
at 5o4 (this does not appear in ix N. E.) : 'Itis not contended by the defendants that the action cannot be maintained, unless the statute in qu9stion is constitutional." Cf. Lincoln v. Hapgood, xi Mass. 350 (184); Meyer v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368, 35 Sup. Ct. 932 (iis).
'Meyer v. Anderson,- supraZ note 25, at 382, 35 Sup. Ct. at 936: "The
qual ication of voters under the constitution of Maryland existed and the statute which previously provided for the registration and election in Annapolis
was unaffected by the void provisions of the statute which we are considermg."
The Court felt that unless this were true the self-operative effect of the Fifteenth Amendment would be nullified.
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II. DIREcT ACT WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION OF JUDICIAL
PRocEsS

A. Collection of Tax Under UnconstitutionalStatute
Money paid to an officer as a tax under an unconstitutional
statute may be recovered if the payment was involuntary and
under protestY

Suppose that the taxpayer brings suit against

the officer individually to recover the money and the latter says in
defence that he has paid the money into the state treasury. Will
he be compelled to make restitution out of his own pocket? The
case of Denzison Mfg. Co. V. Wright 28 presented this question.
The Georgia court there held that the taxpayer would prevail.
In explaining the decision the court pointed out that when the
defendant collected the tax in this case he acted in an individual,
not in an official capacity. This resulted because of the unconstitutionality of the statute. The payment was involuntary, and
was under protest, and was not subject, therefore, to the ordinary
rule with respect to the recovery of payments made under a mistake of law. The protest should put the officer on notice that a
suit would probably be brought to recover the tax, and for that
reason the money should not have been turned over to the state
treasury. The court comforted the officer with the remark that
the legislature would doubtless reimburse him for his loss.29
The court said in the Wright case that the collector was to
be treated exactly as though he had made the collection in the
absence of statute, as a trespasser. With respect to this, the following dictum is to be found in Woolsey v. Dodge,3 0 in which case
an injunction was sought to prevent a series of trespasses by a
county treasurer to collect a tax under a statute alleged to be
unconstitutional:
"The writer hopes to prepare a separate study on "Mistake of Law Under
an Unconstitutional Statute."
23156 Ga. 789, 120 S. E. 120 (1923). For other cases in accord see Note
(1927) 48 A. L. R. z395.
' The legislature of Georgia seems not to have lived up to the judge's
prediction. See also Rushton v. Burke, 6 Dak. 478, 4S N. W. 815 (1889) (illegal tax, though constitutional).
sFed. Cas. No. i8,o32 (C. C. Ohio 1854) ; see San Francisco & N. R. R. v.
Dinwiddie, 13 Fed. 789 (C. C. Cal. 1882) ; Smith v. First Nat. Bank, 17 Mich.
479 (869).
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"There is no axiom of the law better established than
this. A void law can afford no justification to any one who
acts under it; and he who shall attempt to collect the illegal
tax, under the law referred to, will be a trespasser." 31
The state cannot be sued in this case, so it is imperative that the
officer be prevented from proceeding with the illegal collection,
reasoned the court.
B. Destruction or .Invasion.of Property
The cases on this subject are in conflict. Some courts permit
an unconstitutional statute to be used as justification by the defendant officer, while others refuse him this protection.
Dexter v. Alfred 3 2 was a New York case in which trespass
was brought against the defendant for entering upon plaintiff's
land, laying out a road, and cutting trees. The defendant answered that he had been ordered to do so by the commissioner of
highways. The plaintiff assailed the constitutionality of the
statute under which the acts had been performed. The statute
was held unconstitutional, but the court held that despite that fact
it would constitute sufficient justification to defeat the action. In
the opinion of the court:
"It was no part of the duty of the commissioner of
highways to decide whether the law in question was or was
not constitutional. His duty was to execute the law as he
found it." 33

Compare this with the statement of the court in the Norwood
case, 34 quoted above, to the effect that "all persons or officers are
of necessity required to pass upon the validity of all acts or proposed statutes under which they are required to act or to decline
to act." Referring to the rule that ignorance of the law is no
excuse the court stated that this case constituted an exception to
the rule.
'Woolsey v. Dodge, supra note 30, at 607. See 4 POMEROY, op. cit. sUpra
note i, §§ i8o5, 1819.
'64 Hun 636, 19 N. Y. SupP. 7o (1892).
'Ibid., 19 X. Y. Supp. at 771.
I Supra note 12, at 234, 53 So. at 87.
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In SAzafford v. Brovm 85 an action was brought to recover in
trespass for the destruction of apples by "defendants while assuming to act as county fruit inspector and state commissioner of
horticulture, respectively." It appeared that the county inspector
had looked at the apples in question and pronounced them infected, and thereupon ordered the owners to destroy them. On
appeal to the state commissioner the latter inspected them and
sustained the decision of the county inspector. The actuaf destruction of the fruit was done by, or under the immediate direction of, the state commissioner. The statute creating the office
of county inspector, and authorizing the incumbent to perform the
acts in question, was unconstitutional. A demurrer was interposed to the defence that they had relied on the statute. The
demurrer was overruled, apparently on the theory that the state
commissioner was not liable because of valid statutory authority
for his acts, and the county inspector was not liable despite the
unconstitutionality of the statute authorizing him to act. The
ground for exempting the latter officer is not explicitly stated in
the opinion. It is perhaps not without significance that he did
not actually destroy the fruit. All that he did was to examine it
and order its destruction. But the following statement by the
court indicates that even though he had destroyed the fruit, he
would not have been held liable:
"Respondent Brown was acting in good faith under a
statute of the legislature. He doubtless supposed it to be a
valid statute. The owners of the fruit evidently supposed
the same. They recognized Brown as county fruit inspector
by appealing from his decision to the state commissioner ofhorticulture." 36
The court here seems to accord de facto status to Brown.y
The
rule of liability is the same for both de facto and de jure officers
in these cases. The status, whether de jure or de facto, of an
officer is immaterial in liability cases, the gist of the action being
=49 Wash. 307, 3o8, 95 Pac. 27o (Igo8).
Ibid. 3o9, 95 Pac. at 271.
" The author is preparing a separate study on the cases dealing with official
status.
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injury under an unconstitutional statute. It is the performance
of an act, instead of the existence of a status, which is important
in liability cases.38
A third case, which by dictum, at least, supports the view
that an officer is not liable for action under an unconstitutional
statute, is that of Dunn v. Mellon.3 9 In that case the plaintiff did
not sue the officer, but brought trespass against his landlord for
evicting him from a building. The defendant set up by way of
defence an order received from a city officer to move the house,
because the city proposed to open a street through the lot. The
landlord was notified by the city officer that if he did not remove
the building within a specified time the city would proceed to do
so at his expense. The statute was declared unconstitutional in
another case, and as a result this action of trespass was brought.
The court treated the landlord as an agent of the officer, acting
under his direction, and decided that he was not liable. The
process of reasoning whereby the court reached this result was as
follows: if an officer had done the act complained of he would
not have been liable; therefore a citizen acting under the proper
officer's order should not be liable. If anybody was accountable
it was the city, according to the court. On this point the court
said:
"If he had refused to obey it and the proper officer of
the city had removed the building, undoubtedly the city
would be liable for the consequences to any person injured,
if the law under which the act was done was a void law.
But it is just as undoubted that the officer who obeyed his
orders in removing the building would not have been liable
for his acts of obedience to his orders." 40
In opposition to these cases is Hopkins v. Clemson Agricvltural College.4 ' In a suit against the college for damages resulting from the building of a dike the Court held that, if on a new
"Vanderberg v. Connoly, 18 Utah 112, 54 P'ac. io97 (1898); laver v. Mc-

Glachlin, 28 Wis. 364

(1871).

I47 Pa. II,23 AUt. 2rO (1892); cf. Dtmn v. Burleigh, 62 Me. 24, 38

(1873).
'0Ibid. 17,23 Ad. at 210.

"221 U. S. 636, 31 Sup. Ct 654 (1911).
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trial it was shown that damages resulted from the act in question,
they should be allowed, because the statute authorizing tle college
to perform the act complained of was unconstitutional. A decree
ordering the removal of the dike was refused on the ground that
this amounted to a suit against the state, the school being a governmental institution.
An injunction was granted in a New York case, 42 in addition
to damages, to prevent certain state officers from interfering with
the plaintiff's possession of land, and to compensate for past interferences with the same. The officer sought to justify his acts
under a statute enacted subsequent to the acts complained of, but
failed because the statute ratifying his acts was declared invalid.
The officers of a levee district organized under an unconstitutional statute were held liable to damages for authorizing a dam
to be built in a location which resulted in the overflow of the
plaintiff's land. 43 An injunction forbidding the maintenance of
the dam was also granted in this case.
Several cases have held officers liable for the destruction of
animals under the authority of an invalid ordinance or statute. 48a
It is impossible to say that the weight of authority protects
the officer or refuses to protect him in cases involving the invasion
of property rights. The courts are not agreed as to the rule to
be applied in such cases.
C. Interference With Personal Liberty in the Absence of a
Warrant
The cases in this section are to be distinguished from those
to be considered in a subsequent section which involve arrest on a
warrant. Only those cases involving arrest without a warrant
will be dealt with at this point.
With the exception of one dictum, the cases are in accord.
that an officer is liable for an arrest without a warrant under an
=Saratoga, etc., Corp. v. Pratt, 227 N. Y. 429, 125 N. E. 834 (1920).

Moulton v. Parks, 64 Cal. 166, 30 Pac. 6x3 (x883).
' Loesch v. Koehler, 144 Ind. 278, 43 N. E. 129 (1895) ; Waud v. Craw-ford, I6o Iowa 432, 141 N. W. o41 (1913) ; Carter v. Colby, 71 N. H. 230, 51
Ati. 904 (go2).
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unconstitutional statute. 44 In Tilhnan v. Beard 45 the president
of the village ordered the village marshal to arrest the plaintiff
for violating an ordinance prohibiting the operation of popcorn
wagons on the streets. Other facts, immaterial so far as the
action for the arrest was concerned, appeared in the case, but
among the various grounds of action alleged by the plaintiff was
that of assault and battery in making the arrest. It appeared that
the ordinance was void, whether because it was contrary to a
statute or the state constitution is not clear. The court held that
the arrest was illegal, saying that in view of the fact that there
had been no felony committed, and there was no likelihood of
immediate escape, "By ordering the arrest, he made himself responsible for it, and liable for all its consequences." 46 Sumnzer v.
BeeIer 4T is also to be included in this group of cases, for the court
treated it as if it presented a case of arrest without a warrant,
although it is impossible to tell from the report of the case whether
this was the fact or not. In Williants v. Morris 48 one of the
inferior courts of Ohio said in dictum that the officer should not
be held liable. The reason advanced by the court for this view
was that the presumption that a statute is valid should serve to
protect the officer making an arrest under it.
A literal false imprisonment was involved in Grossv. Rice.49

Gross was committed to prison following conviction for crime.
"Some of these cases also involved suits for malicious prosecution. This
phase of the problem will be considered in the next section, dealing with acts
concerning judicial proceedings. These cases, with the exception of Gross v.
Rice, i,fra note 49, involve ordinances, but if Sumner v. Beeler, infra note
47, be viewed as an arrest without a warrant case it should be classified as
involving a statute.

§ r48, special note.

Cf. RESTATEMENT ON TORTS (Am. L. Inst., No. s, I927)

"12i Mich. 475, 8o N. W. 248 (i8gg).
"Ibd. 477, 8o N. W. at 248. Barling v. West, 29 Wis. 307 (871),

in-

volved an arrest without a warrant by the president and marshal of a village
for the alleged violation of an ordinance which was contrary to a state statute, and perhaps (although not entirely clear) unconstitutional. Held, a verdict for $5o was affirmed. Cf. Hofschulte v. Doe, 78 Fed. 436 (C. C. Cal.
1897),
on the first count of the complaint.
7
5o Ind. 341 (1875). In Chapman v. Selover, 172 App. Div. 858, I59
N. Y. Supp. 632 (1916), it was held that an ordinance of a city, which was
ultra vires under the statutes of the state, did not afford justification to a police
officer who made an arrest under it without a warrant
114 Ohio Cir. Ct. (x. s.) 353, 358 (igir).
197z Me. 241 (IM80).
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A statute provided that the number of days spent in solitary confinement should be excluded in computing the term. In accordance with this statute the defendant (warden) kept Gross in
prison sixty-eight days longer than the commitment called for,
leaving out of view the days spent in solitary confinement. Upon
his release Gross sued the warden for trespass to the person and
false imprisonment. The statute under which the warden had
acted in computing the period for which Gross should have been
confined was held to be unconstitutional. The Maine court
allowed recovery against the warden. In answer to the contention that the warden should be protected until the statute had
been declared invalid, the court made this reply:
"We do not comprehend the logic of a statute having
effect as if constitutional, when not so; to be a law for one
purpose and not another; a law for one man and not another.
It must be either valid or invalid from the beginning, or from
the date of the constitutional provision affecting it." 50
Yet, as illustrated by numerous cases, 5 1 many courts are doing, in
other branches of the law, exactly what the Maine court here
thought impossible; holding a statute constitutional for one purpose, though not for another. The court in the Gross case was
looking at the situation through the spectacles of doctrine as to
the effect of an unconstitutional statute, instead of looking at the
doctrine through the facts of the case.
With respect to the question of damages, the court thought
that punitive damages should not be allowed, but that actual
damages only should be recovered. In accord with the Norwood case 52 is the statement of the court that "the warden is
only liable to the perils that more or less follow official stations.
He had no warrant of court that could protect him." 13 The legislature of Maine subsequently made an appropriation to indemT

Ibid. 252.

'For some illustrations of this, see Field, The Status of a Mnuicipal

Corporation Organized Under anr Unconstitutio
(1929) 27 MIcm. L. REv.
'Supra note 12.
= Supra note 49, at 252.

Statute, to be published in
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nify Rice for the amount of the judgment and the expenses of
suit.54
There seems to be a greater tendency, in the cases dealing
with direct and positive acts of officers under an unconstitutional
law, for the courts to permit the statute to be used as a justification by the officer in situations involving the violation of a property right, than is true of those involving the violation of personal
liberty. The courts are apparently more severe on the officer if
the case is one of false arrest or false imprisonment than if it turns
on a trespass to land or other property.

III. AcTIoN CONNECTED WITHE

JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

A defendant who conceives himself aggrieved because action
has been brought against him in a court, with resulting arrest,
seizure of goods, or trespass to land, may choose one or all of
several parties against whom to bring his suit. The cases to be
taken up in the several sections of this division illustrate the rules
with respect to the various persons who may be made parties
defendant, and the extent of their liability, if any, for participating in the proceeding at one of its several stages.
A. Liability for Making Complaint or FilingAffidavit
The first step in an action for violating an ordinance or
statute is often that of making a complaint or filing an affidavit.
Is an officer liable to an action for damages for filing an affidavit
which results in the arrest and punishment of the plaintiff? The
rule is well established that he is not. In Goodwin v. Guild 5' the
mayor procured another officer to make an affidavit that the plaintiff had violated a city ordinance which was contrary to a statute
of the state. In an action against the mayor and the officer
neither of them was held liable. The mayor was entrusted by
statute with the duty of enforcing city ordinances; there had been
Me. Resolves (i88r) c.

22.

"Resolved, that the sum of two hundred

and sixty-three dollars, be and the same is hereby appropriated out of the state
treasury, to be paid to Warren W. Rice, the same being for moneys paid by
him as damages, costs, and expenses, by reason of a suit brought against him
by Darrius Gross, an ex-convict, for false imprisonment."
094 Tenn. 486, 29 S. W. 721 (1895)..
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considerable dispute between the various officers of the city concerning the validity of the ordinance; and no ill will had been
shown on the part of the defendants, so that, according to the
court, there was no ground for imposing liability upon them. In
Trammell v. Town of Rmsselville 6 a similar result was reached
where the ordinance was unconstitutional. Another case to the
same effect contains this statement:
"A party in good faith making a complaint for the violation of any law or ordinance is not required to take the risk
of being mulcted in damages if courts afterwards hold it
unconstitutional." 57
The same court also asked why the officer making the comnlaint
should be liable when he would not be liable for serving the warrant. 8 This assumes that the officer serving the warrant is not
liable, which as will be pointed out later, -is not entirely settled.
An officer who institutes proceedings against a person for the
violation of a statute does not act without probable cause merely
because the statute turns out to be unconstitutional. 59 Probable
cause is not dependent on the validity of the statute under which
the prosecution was instituted. The rule is the same whether
complaint is made leading to the issuance of a warrant of arrest
or one for search and seizure. 0 One case contains a dictum that
'34 Ark. 105 (1879).
"Tillman v. Beard, supra note 45, at 477, 8o N. W. at 248. See Hallock
v. Dominy, 69 N. Y. 238 (1877), where the court said, at 241: "Process regularly issued upon this judgment, as was the execution upon which the plaintiff
was imprisoned, was a protection to the officer executing it, and to the parties at whose instance it was issued and served!'
'Tillman v. Beard, supra note 45, at 477, 8o N. W. at 248: "If the officer is protedted in the service of the warrant, in which act he is performing
a duty imposed upon him by law, why should he not be equally exempt where
he is in the performance of his duty in making complaint for the violation

of an ordinance of his municipality?"
5 Birdsall v. Smith, r58 Mich. 390, 122 N. W. 626 (igo9). The complaint
in this case was filed on the order of a superior officer. Suit was, however,
also brought against the local inspector who procured the bottle of milk for
purposes of chemical analysis. The court held neither of the officers liable.
The court said in dictum that if the officers had known the statute to be unconstitutional the result would have been different The case would then have
been similar to that referred to in dicta in some of the cases; that liability
would attach if bad motive were shown. Infra note 64.
.
Anheuser Busch Brewing Co. v. Hammond, 93 Iowa 52o, 61 N. W. io52
(1895) (statute contrary to federal statutes on interstate commerce).
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if the functions of complainant and magistrate are both entrusted
to the same officer the issuance of a warrant under such a statute,
if it be invalid, will subject the magistrate to liability. 61 The
magistrate in such a case acts as a complainant, however, and in
so doing should not be held liable, even though the statute be
unconstitutional. There is no reason why the rule should be different as to the complainant in this last case from those involving complaints by other officers under invalid statutes. In fact,
there is the more reason for exempting the magistrate in such a
case, because not only does the rule as to complainants tend to
exempt him, but the tendency of the cases is also to exempt him
as magistrate, for issuing the warrant, on the ground that he
exercises a judicial function in so doing. If liability would not
attach when these two functions were entrusted to two persons,
there is no reason for imposing it when the two functions are
combined in the same person.
The same doctrine is applied to private individuals who make
complaints or file affidavits that an ordinance or statute is being
violated. 62 But if the statute authorizing the issuance of an at"See Clark v. lnpton, 163 Ky. 698, 7oi, 174 S. W. 490, 491 (1915).
'Bohri v. Barnett; i Fed. 389 (C. C. A. 7th, Igo6). The court said, at
392: "Any other rule would be harsh in the extreme--imposing on one who
had witnessed a violation of a local ordinance the responsibility of knowing
whether, as a matter of law, the ordinance itself was valid, or of remaining
silent." And in Barker v. Stetson, 7 Gray 53, 54 (Mass. 856), the court said:
"The authorities are conclusive that, when a person does no more than to prefer a complaint to a magistrate, he is not liable in trespass for the acts done
under the warrant which the magistrate thereupon issues, even though the magistrate has no jurisdiction." In commenting on a charge to a jury, given in the
court below, it was said in Wheeler v. Gavin, s Ohio Cir. Ct 246, 253 (1890):
"But the charge of the court was in effect saying to the jury that whehever
a magistrate issues a warrant or a person files an affidavit for an arrest, they
must not only be sure that there is a statute or ordinance warranting such
proceedings, but they must be certain of its constitutionality and validity. In so
charging the jury the court below erred, and for that error the judgment will
be reversed." Cf. Vanderberg v. Connoly, supra note 38; Fenelon v. Butts,
49 Wis. 342, 5 N. W. 784 (188o) (commissioner before whom supplemental
proceedings were had was appointed for two counties, contrary to the constitutional requirement of one for each county) ; Rush v. Buckley, loo Me. 322,
61 AUt. 774 (i9O5) (ordinance never went into effect, because not published).
It has been held that where there is room for an honest difference in belief
as to the constitutionality of a statute malicious prosecution will fail. Cobbey
v. State Journal Co., 77 Neb. 626, 113 N. W. 224 (19O7) (rival printer got
injunction against plaintiff, the statute on which defendant relied being invalid).
In Scott v. Flowers, 6o Neb. 675, 84 N. W. 81 (igoo), an action for malicious
prosecution was brought for causing plaintiff to be taken into custody and put
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tachment is unconstitutional the individuals procuring it will be
liable, and for this purpose a city is in the same position as a
private litigant.6 3
The main reason for denying liability in the case of officers
as well as of private individuals is that any other rule would
impede the administration of justice. The possibility of an action
for damages should not be hung above the officer's head as a
deterrent in such cases. In many instances considerable reliance
is placed on the initiative of private individuals to aid in the
enforcement of laws. For this reason they too should be free
from such a deterrent. Although no case has been found which
involved the question of action by an officer in making a complaint under an unconstitutional statute, the complaint being
malicious, there are many intimations and dicta to the effect that
if meddlesome interference, bad motive in making the complaint,
or active direction in making the arrest by the officer were present,
liability would attach.64 Such a case would turn, however, not
on the effect of an unconstitutional statute, but on the presence of
some other factor which causes the court to impose liability.
into a state girls' school, the statute under which commitment was procured
being defective in that the age fixed in it as the maximum was higher than
permitted by the state constitution. Plaintiff recovered damages for malicious
prosecution. On rehearing; 6T Neb. 620, 85 N. W. 857 (igoi), the statute
was held constitutional, the court deciding to give effect to it within the limits
of the age provided for by the constitution. This caused a reversal of the
case, but it is to be noted that the court did not, on rehearing, abandon its
position that liability would attach for malicious prosecution. The court seemed
influenced by a showing of ill will. If the case is to be taken as authority
on malicious prosecution it is contrary to the other cases cited or considered
thus far. In accord with the general i-ile is Gifford v. Wiggins, So Minn. 401,
52 N. W. 904 (1892), where Mitchell, J., said, at 405, 52 N. W. at 9o5: "Under
any other doctrine a person would never feel safe in making complaint of the
commission of a public offense until the validity of the statute creating the offense had been passed upon by the court of last resort"
"Zimmerman-v. Lamb, 7 Minn. 42x (i862); Merrit v. St Paul, ii Minn.
223 (1865), where the court said, at 231: "It follows that the appellants who
instructed the sheriff to make the particular levy complained of, under the
warrant in question, acted without authority or jurisdiction, and were, therefore,
trespassers." Cf. Hayes v. Hutchinson, 8z Wash. 394, 142 Pac. 865 (i914).
°"Supra note 59. In Barker v. Stetson, mtpr note 62, at 54, this statement was made: "If the complaint is malicious and without probable cause,
the complainant may be answerable in another form of action." See the following from Goodwin v. Guild, supra note 55, at 490, 29 S. W. at -722: "If he
took advantage of his official position to oppress the plaintiff, either from ill
will towards him, or because of any other improper motive, he would be
liable."
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B. Liability of Magistrate for Issuance of Warrant, Trying, or
Sentencing a Person Under an Invalid Statute
The early cases on the liability of a justice of the peace or
other inferior magistrate who issued a warrant or tried a person
accused of petty crime under an unconstitutional statute held the
magistrate liable. 5 The later cases have relaxed this rule so that
.now, although the rule is presumably the same in the states in
which the earlier cases were decided, several states have adopted
a contrary rule."6 If a numerical count of either the states or
decisions be made the great weight of authority will be found to
be in favor of exempting the inferior magistrate for action by him
in accordance with a statute or ordinance which is unconstitutional, and the same rule is followed if the ordinance is contrary
to the statutes of the state.
Two early Massachusetts cases, Barker v. Stetson 67 and
Kelly v. Bemis,"8 adopt the rule imposing liability on the magistrate. In the first case a magistrate issued process authorizing an
officer to seize plaintiff's liquor, the process being issued in accordance with a section of a statute which was later held unconstitutional. An action was brought against the magistrate as well as
the officer, and both of them were held liable. The court said
that inasmuch as the statute conferring jurisdiction to issue the
process was invalid the magistrate had no jurisdiction, and for
that reason was liable in trespass. The second case decided that
a magistrate was liable in trespass for issuing a warrant on which
the plaintiff was arrested, the statute authorizing the issuance of
the warrant being invalid. The reason given for this result was
as f6llows: that our government was one of limited powers; none
I Kelly v. Bemis, 4 Gray 83 (Mass. 1855) ; Barker v. Stetson, spra note
62; Ely v. Thompson, 3 A. K. Marsh. 70 (Ky. i82o); cf. Heller v. Clarke,
121 Wis. 71, 98 N. W. 952 (1904).
A justice of the peace was held liable
for false imprisonment for putting the plaintiff in jail until trial, when he
bad no jurisdiction over the case, as a statute had given jurisdiction over this
class of cases to a city court.
I Cottam v. Oregon City, gS Fed. 570 (C. C. Ore. 1899); Hofschulte v.
Doe, 78 Fed. 436 (C. C. Cal. 1897); Brooks v. Mangan, 86 Mich. 576, 49
N. W. 633 (89 r ) ; McDaniel v. Harrell, 81 Fla. 66, 87 So. 631 (192i); Trammell v. Town of Russellville, 34 Ark. io5 (z879). See infra note 73.
"Supra note 67.
'Sitrra note 65.
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of the departments of the government could exceed the power
given to them by the constitution; therefore the legislature having
attempted by an excess of its power to grant power to the judicial
branch, such an attempted grant was ineffectual. There being no
statutory grant of jurisdiction it followed that the court had none.
It therefore followed that the justice who attempted to exercise
jurisdicion when he had none was liable in trespass.
Ely v. Thompson Il was decided in 182o by the Kentucky

court, and was an action of trespass, assault, and battery, as well
as false imprisonment against the justice of the peace and constable who had respectively sentenced the plaintiff to thirty lashes,
and had administered them. They were held liable, the court
observing that the constitution was above the law:
"It is an instrument that every officer of government is
bound to know and preserve, at his peril, whether his office
be judicial or ministerial; and he cannot justify an act against
its provisions, even with the authority of the legislature to
aid him, however much that may mitigate his case." 70
This case is affected somewhat by the fact that the action taken
here was in direct violation of a constitutional provision, and did
not involve a typical case of permissible action, so far as the constitution is concerned, being taken under a statute which in some
phase of form or substance is not in accordance with the constitution. A recent dictum by the Kentucky court tends to support
the view of the two Massachusetts cases adverted to, but in the
same case in which the dictum was uttered, it was held that the
magistrate was not liable for denying bail, because that was done
in the exercise of a judicial function.71
These are the only cases holding the magistrate liable for
acting in accordance with an unconstitutional statute. The federal
courts have taken the opposite view, and refuse to impose liability.72 They have stressed the fact that inferior judges are within
the reason of the rule exempting superior judges from liability for
=Supra note 65.
' Supra note 65, at 76.
"See Clark v. Hampton, 163 Ky. 698, 7o, 174 S. W. 490, 491 (1915).
71 Cottam v. Oregon City, Hofscbulte v. Doe, both mspra note 66.
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mistakes in judgment as to the constitutionality of a statute, or
for that matter, for mistakes of law in general. That the justices
had general jurisdiction over the type of subject matter involved
in the particular case has also been looked upon as a factor supporting the rule of exemption. There being jurisdiction, the case
becomes one of excess of jurisdiction only, rather than one involving an exercise of jurisdiction where none existed at all.
The state courts stress similar reasons and factors to support
the rule as to exemption, giving them more elaborate statement in
many cases. The existence of jurisdiction in general; the presence of good faith; the absence of bad faith; that he had jurisdiction over the person; that the mayor or recorder had in addition
to his judicial functions the general oversight of the administration of law in the village; that it was his duty to issue the warrant;
that in issuing the process or in sentencing the accused he performed a judicial act, in which the constitutionality of the statute
or ordinance was passed upon; that exempting inferior judges
from liability is necessary to an impartial and effective administration of justice, have all been stressed in greater or lesser degree
by the courts ad6pting a rule contrary to that of the early
Massachusetts cases.
The rule exempting magistrates is applied where the ordinance is invalid because contrary to a statute, 73 or where county
regulations are in excess of the power of the supervisors,7 4 and
in a case where an ordinance is in excess of the statutory powers
granted to a city by the state.78 The rule has been carried so far
that a magistrate escaped liability even though the ordinance under
76
which action was taken had never gone into effect.
" Goodwin v. Guild, stspra note 55; Calhoun v. Little, io6 Ga. 336,
S. E. 86 (189); Wheeler v. Gavin, supra note 62.

32

"Hallock v. Dominy, 69 N. Y. 238 (1877).

7 Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa 378, 7 N. W. 623 (i88o).
,'Rush v. Buckley, mtpra note 62, in which notice of the ordinance was not
published as required by statute. The court stressed the fact that the justice
had general jurisdiction in the city and over this type of subject, and that the
mistake in thinking the ordinance was in effect was an error in judgment and
for such errors the judge, though inferior, could not be held. A dissenting
judge said, at 336, 61 Adt. at 780: "I think the majority opinion holds doc-

trines impairing the right of personal liberty and subversive of long established rules of law in this state. In Clark v. Spicer, 6 Kan. 440 (i87o), a
justice was held not liable for trying a man with a six-man jury.
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In view of the definite trend away from the early Massachusetts rule it is perhaps accurate to say that the rule is becoming
well settled now that petty judicial officers are being accorded the
same standing as judges of courts of general trial jurisdiction, so
far as their liability for acts done in reliance, not only on an
unconstitutional statute or ordinance, but also on an invalid ordiance, are concerned. This rule is essential to effective work by
inferior judicial officers, and should become firmly embedded in
judicial doctrine with the revived interest now being taken in the
improvement of these petty courts.
C. Liability of Officer Serving Process
The authorities on this subject are about evenly divided, but
many of the cases holding that the officer serving a process under
an unconstitutional statute is liable were decided before or about
the time of the Civil War. Several of the cases adopting the
contrary rule have been decided within the last half century. For
this reason, while it is accurate, on the basis of a.numerical count,
to say that the cases are about evenly divided, it is perhaps more
accurate to say that the trend of the recent cases is away from
such liability. This is, as previously indicated, in keeping with
the trend of the courts with respect to the liability of magistrates,
although in the latter cases it is more pronounced than in the cases
of ministerial officers.
Early cases in Massachusetts, 77 Kentucky,78 Minnesota ;79
and later decisions in Wisconsin, 0 Mlaine,1 and Texas 82 hold the
7-Fisher v. McGirr, i Gray i (Mass. 1854); Barker v. Stetson, supra
note 62.
'Ely v. Thompson, stepra note 65.
Guerin v. Hunt, 8 Minn. 477 (1863) ; Zimmerman v. Lamb, supra note
63. Both of these cases involved attachments. In the first of them, Guerin
v. Hunt, supra, the court said, at 487: "This would make the Defendants
trespassers as to the taking of the property from the Plaintiff's possession,
even although it should be found that the assignment . . . was fraudulent,
as against the creditors of the assignors!' The goods had been taken from the
possession of the assignee in this case.
I Campbell v. Sherman, 35 Wis. 1o3 (1874) ; see (i8p8) 12 HARv. L. Rrv.
352.
"Warren v. Kelley, 8o Me. 51, iSAt. 49 (7888).
'Beavers v. Goodwin, 90 S. W. 930 (Tex. Civ. App. i9o5).
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officer liable. This unsatisfactory statement is found in the early
case of Fisherv. McGirr:
"The law relied on for a justification, being void, gave
the magistrate no jurisdiction and no authority to issue the
search warrant, the officer cannot justify the seizure under it,
and therefore an action lies against him for the taking." 83
Few of the cases holding the officer liable add very much to this
statement in support of the rule. In Campbell v. Sherman, 4
however, this was added: that a process is not fair on its face
when it shows that it was issued on a. maritime lien, because that
would indicate that a state court would not have jurisdiction to
issue the process.
The Campbell case also stated the doctrine that ignorance of
the law does not excuse, justifying the statement by asserting that
if it were an excuse everybody would plead it as an excuse, and,
as a result, the administration of justice would be hampered. The
most substantial of the reasons advanced in favor of imposing
liability is that the officer may protect himself by the simple device
of taking a bond before he acts. The court said, relative to this:
"If the act which the writ commanded him to do was a
trespass, he was not required to perform it. Nor would he
be liable in that case to the plaintiff for refusing to execute a
process void for want of jurisdiction." 85
If this prediction were a correct statement of the rules of law the
officer would not be in such a serious plight, for he could then
protect himself, either by taking bond, or by refusing to act if the
act would be a trespass, and would also be prolected in refusing
to act, because to act would be a trespass. The cases hitherto
considered on the question of damages for refusal to act leave
this matter in some doubt, however, and it is not at all certain that
*'Supranote 77, at 46.
"'Supranote 8o. In this case a sheriff who seized a ship on process issuing out of a state court in the enforcement of a maritime lien was held liable
for damages for the burning of the ship while it was in his possession. The
sheriff's deputy had actually executed the process. A case on almost all fours,
except that the sheriff seems to have acted directly, rather than through a deputy, was that of Warren v. Kelley, supra note 81. The result was identical,
liability being imposed.
' Campbell v. Sherman, supra note So, at 11o.
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the result indicated by the Wisconsin court would be reached by
all courts. The taking of bond is quite common in practice,
but in small cases it might cause more delay, inconvenience and
trouble than is justified. In the larger cases a bond of indemnity
could be taken by the officer. That only means, however, that the
officer protects himself. The citizen will then have to bear the
loss, a result not very much more desirable, though somewhat
less objectionable, than to have it fall on the officer.
The liability of officers, or of private individuals who assist
an officer in the execution of a search warrant or other process, or
in the asportation or destruction of property, is not well settled,
but there is some authority for believing that they will be held
liable in some states, if they act under an invalid statute, 6 al-

87
though there is authority to the contrary also.

The many recent congressional investigations, with attendant
commands from the houses of that body that various individuals
appear to testify before them or their committees, make the case
of Kilbourn v. Thompson s of increased interest at the present
time. The facts of that case are so well known that they do not
require rehearsing at this point. The phase of this famous case to
which attention is called in this connection is that concerning the
suit for damages brought against the Sergeant-at-Arms of the
House of Representatives for having arrested and falsely imprisoned the plaintiff by virtue of a warrant issued by the Speaker of
the House, the warrant being issued in excess of his constitutional
power. The first trial resulted in a verdict of $6o,ooo. A new
trial was had and the verdict then returned amounted to $37,500.
A remittitur of $17,500 was filed and the award then stood at
$2o,ooo.

This amount was paid by Congress, in addition to an

appropriation to compensate Thompson for his expenses and
attorney's fees in connection with the case.89

Here, as in the

'Beavers v. Goodwin, safpra note 82; cf. Cartwright v. Canode, ro6 Tx.
502, 171 S. W. 6g6 (914).
'See Henke v. McCord, supra note 75 (one oficer aiding another).
Mio13 U. S. 168 (88o).
The case involving suit for false imprisonment

and false arrest is by the same name, in MacArthur & M. 401 (D. C. 1883).
8D23 STAT. 446, 467 (r885). The appropriations were: to Kilbourn, $2o.ooo
plus $143.17 interest and costs; to Thompson, $5ooo for expenses, labor and
-attention with respect to the case; to Thompson's attorneys, $3000 for professional services.
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Gross case,90 in Maine, the legislature came to the rescue of an
officer who had acted to his injury in reliance on action by a legislative body, in the form of a statute in the one case; in the form
of a warrant of arrest in the other.
The cases refusing to hold the officer liable 91 argue that the
process is fair on its face; taking issue on this point with the
-cases in which liability is imposed. They insist that unconstitutionality is not shown on the face of a warrant, for example, and
that it is a fiction to speak of a line between clear and palpable
unconstitutionality and any other kind. They point out too, that
the administration of justice will be hampered by the introduction
of a rule of liability in such cases, because the officers will be slow
to act, and it might be added also, that even though bonds of
indemnity be taken where property is involved, such a practice
tends also to slow up the already dilatory processes of the law.
To ask the ministerial officer to be a judge as well as an "executioner" seems to some of the courts to be too high a requirement
to impose upon constables, sheriffs, and other police and processexecuting officers. The process appears to be regular in these
cases; the justice or clerk issuing it does so in accordance with
statutory provisions which have all of the appearance of law, and
may have been on the statute books of the state unchallenged for
many years; and the existence of a presumption in favor of the
validity of legislative enactments, all combine to cause the courts
of a number of states, in the later cases, to refuse to hold the
officer liable. No distinction is made, in the cases pro or con on
this subject, between those involving unconstitutional statutes,
unconstitutional ordinances, or ordinances which are contrary to
general state statutes. The policies causing a court to go one way
Supra note 49.
' Cottam v. Oregon City, supra note 66 (ordinance) ; Hofschulte v. Doe,

ibid. (ordinance); Trammell v. Town of Russellvifle, i id. (ordinance); Bohri

v. Barnett, mpra note 62 (ordinance) ; Tillman v. Beard, .ipra note 45 (ordinance contrary to statute) ; Henke v. McCord, supra note 75 (ordinance in excess of city's statutory powers); Rush v. Buckley, mtpra note 62 (ordinance

had not gone into effect) ; Anheuser Busch Brewing Co. v. Hammond, supra

note 6o; cf. Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 285 (186) ; cf. also RESTATEMENT
ozz TORTS (Am. L. Inst., No. 3, 1927) § 149-3 (7), (8). It seems that the

does not provide for cases wherein the statute other than the.one
conferring jurisdiction is unconstitutional, so far as arrest with a warrant is
concerned.
RESTATEMENT
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or another on this point apply with equal or nearly equal force to
all three.
Irrespective of the liability of an officer for serving a warrant
or other process under an unconstitutional statute, that fact does
not justify the person upon whom it is served in forcibly resisting
92
the execution.
D. Liability of the City or Governmental Unit for Whom the
Officer Acts
In Trescott v. City of Waterloo 93 suit was brought against
the city to recover damages for the enforcement of an unconstitutional ordinance. The lower federal court before whom the case
was tried denied recovery. In support of this decision the court
observed that the police regulations of the city were not made for
the city alone, and that they were made in a public capacity,
instead of in a corporate capacity; phrased in more customary
language, that they were exercises of the governmental power of
the city as distinguished from exercises of private or proprietary
powers. Some stress was also laid on the fact that the fine was
very small; for that reason it should have been paid under protest,
or, if the plaintiff had wished to appeal, he could have resisted
the payment of the fine in that way. But, as it happened in this
case, the plaintiff preferred to go to jail. While this is not conclusive, it nevertheless seemed to influence the court in its attitude
towards the case.
The state cases follow the same rule. Thus in Trammell v.
Town of Rusellville 94 the court denied recovery in a suit against
the city, saying:
"Then, for neither the act of the council in passing the
ordinance, the acts of the mayor in issuing the warrants, nor
those of the marshal and his deputy in making the arrests,
was the town liable to the plaintiff." 95
'State v. McNally, 34 Me. 210 (852); cf. State v. Skinner, 148 La. 143,
86 So. 716 (192o).
236 Fed. 592 (C. C. Iowa M8s) ; Cottam v. Oregon City, supra note 66.
"Supra note 66.
I'Supra note 66, at

9og.See also City of Albany v. Cunliff,

2

N. Y. 165

(I849) ; Easterly v. Town of Irwin, 99 Iowa 694, 68 N. W. 99 (1896) ; City
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PROTCTIoN Or OFFICERS ACTING OR REFUSING TO ACT
UNDER AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE

A brief summary of the rules concerning officers' liability
may serve to emphasize the need for some program of protection.
1. Officers are liable for refusal to act if the statute
authorizing them to act turns out to be constitutional and if
some private individual has been injured thereby.

2. Officers are liable for taxes collected under invalid
statutes if they were paid under protest and their payment
was involuntary. The fact that the officer has paid the
money into the state treasury will not be a defense to such
an action.
3. There is a conflict of authority as to whether an
officer is liable for the destruction or invasion of property
under an unconstitutional statute.
4. Officers are liable for interference with personal liberty if such interference is justified solely on the ground of
an invalid statute.
5. Officers are not liable for making complaints under
invalid statutes.
6. The weight of authority is that magistrates are not
liable for issuance of process or committing a person under
an unconstitutional law, but a few cases impose liability.
7. Officers executing process under an unconstitutional
law are held liable in some states but not in others, although
the tendency seems to be to exempt them and to treat them
as executing "fair" process.
This is the distribution by the courts of the risk of error in
the operation of government, due to the effect upon an officer
of Caldwell v. Prunelle, 57 Kan. 511, 46 Pac. 949 (1896); McFadin v. City
of San Antonio, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 140, 54 S. W. 48 (i899) ; Taylor v. City
of Owensboro, 98 Ky. 271, 32 S. W. 948 (1895); cf. McGraw v. Town of
Marion, 98 Ky. 673, 34 S. W. r8 (i896) ; 6 McQunumx, MuNIcrPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 28II; WILLAmS, THz LiAIiTY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS FOR TORT (1901) 37-39. In Goodwin v. Guild, supra note 55, suit was
brought against the city, the city council, mayor, and board, which had let the
contract under which the work was being done. The city, mayor, councilmen,
and board were all held not liable. In Kilbourn v. Thompson, MacArthur &
M. 40 (D. C. 1883), the members of the House who had participated in the
proceedings resulting in the issuance of the warrant, were held not liable.
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of an unconstitutional statute. The rule obtaining in all of the
states that the government cannot be sued without its own consent prevented the courts from including it among those to share
the burden. Consent to suit in ordinary tort cases has not been
given by the states, and in the case of the national government a
beginning only has been made. The courts have, therefore, attempted to place the burden either upon the officer or upon the
citizen. The result has been, as indicated in the summary, that
the officer has been forced to carry most of the burden.
Viewing the problem as one of judicial distribution of risk,
can anything be done by judicial decision to make the rules more
equitable? The rule which could probably be improved by this
method is that concerning refusal of officers to act. Here the
courts might well have held that if the private individual knows
that the officer is refusing to act he should be compelled to resort
to mandamus, rather than be permitted to bring an action for
damages. in a mandamus proceeding many courts would permit
a determination of the constitutionality of the statute under which
the officer was asked to act, and all courts should permit this in
cases where the officer would be liable to an action for damages if
he acted pursuant to the writ."s If this be done the matter can
be settled in many cases without any greater inconvenience than
the delay incident to the hearing in mandamus. This would be a
distinct step in advance, and could be accomplished by the application of well-settled legal principles.
There are some cases which cannot be disposed of by the use
of mandamus. There may hot be sufficient time to wait even
for this summary procedure. It may be that the private individual does not know, and could not, under the circumstances, be
expected to know, that the officer is refusing to act, and in the
meantime the rights of the individual might be adversely affected.
For example, if X goes to the register of deeds with a mortgage
""But the weight of authority sustains the allowance of a defence of
this character on the ground that an unconstitutional statute is not a law and
binds no one." 38 C. j. 922. For review of the cases, and the arguments
in favor of raising the question of 'onstitutionality in mandamus proceedings,
see State v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 Pac. 285 (19o9). Rapacz, Protection
of Offlcers Who Act Under Unconstitutionual Statutes, snpra note 2; Field,
Effect of an Unconstitutional Statifte (1926) 1 IND. L. J. 1, (1926) 6o Am. L.
RFV. 232, (1927) oo CENT. L. 3. 145, n. 41.
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and leaves it for recording, and the officer, saying nothing, says
to himself, "I will not record this mortgage because the statute
authorizing it is unconstitutional," X can hardly be held to know
that the officer is refusing to record the mortgage, at least for a
period of several days. In such a case it may be only fair to say
that an officer should notify the private individual of his intention
not to comply with the statute because of the belief that it is unconstitutional, and failing this, he should be liable for the loss
occasioned by the failure to perform the duty. 7 These two sug-.
gestions, if embodied in judicial decision, might aid in more
equitably distributing the burden of loss in these cases.
In most of the other situations embraced by the rules in the
foregoing summary, the citizen, rather than the officer, should
bear the burden, as between the two. The normal case should be
that the officer acts in compliance with and reliance on statutes as
if they were constitutional. The effective functioning of the
administrative branch of government requires this. But although
it may be somewhat more desirable for the individual citizen to
suffer in these cases than to impose the burden of paying for the
mistakes of the legislative branch of government upon the officer,
to leave the burden with the private cifizen is unfair. For this
reason the possibilities of solution for the problem by means of
judicial administration are very limited. The problem is, in the
final analysis, one for legislative consideration.
The first aid which the legislature of a state could give is the
enactment of the DeclaratoryJudgment Act. Many of the states
now have this act and many more will doubtless adopt it in the
near future. 8
The next step which legislatures should take concerns the
'The writer is indebted to Professor Dudley 0. McGovney for this suggestion.
'On the declaratory judgment see the following articles by Professor Edwin M. Borchard: The Declaratory Judgment-A Needed Procedural Reform
(19z8) 28 YALEn L. J. I, 105; The Uniform Act on Declaratory Judgments
(1921) 34 HARV.L. REv. 697. On government liability and responsibility in tort
see Borchard, Governtment Liability in Tort (1g4) 34 YALE L. J.I, 129, 29;
Government Responsibility in Tort-A Proposed Statutory Reform (1925) It
VA. L. REG. (T. s.) 330, (1925) 11 A. B. A. J.495; Goventment Responsibility
in Tort (1926) 36 YALE L. J. I; Theories of Govenment Respmsibility in Tort
(1928) 28 Cor, L. REV. 734. See also Borchard, European Systems of State
Indemnity for Errorsof Criminal Justice (1913) 3 J.CR. L. AND CR-M. 684;
WATxms,TEa STATE As A PARTY LrIGANT (1927) Cs. 2-4, 7, 8, 10.
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giving of consent to suit by the state in some regular tribunal,
whether it be a special court such as the Federal Court of Claims,
adding to its jurisdiction cases in tort, or one of the regular courts
in the existing judicial system of the state. If the legislature
enacts a statute which it has no power to enact, or does so in a
manner forbidden to it, the inferior officers in the judicial and
administrative branches of the government should not pay for
the mistake. Neither should the citizen pay for it. The loss
occasioned by the error should be borne by the people of the state
as a group. No one individual should be held liable, on the sole
ground that the statute was unconstitutional. Officers should be
liable for malicious exercise of power, or other abuse of their
authority, in accordance with the established rules of torts. But
neither the officer nor the citizen should be made to bear the burden of a legislative error, on the sole ground that the legislature
exceeded some constitutional limitation resting upon it, and that
the officer or individual acted in accordance therewith.
The matter is not so difficult in the national government.
There the risk can be spread over a large number, and the burden
on each person becomes very small. When we come to the states
the difficulties are more numerous. The states carry on many of
their functions through the medium of county, township, and
municipal officers. These officers perform some functions for the
state and others for the local community. In some instances the
ordinances authorizing them to act will be unconstitutional, or
perhaps contrary to the general statutes of the state. In other
cases state statutes authorizing them to perform some function
will be invalid. But state statutes may authorize the performance of a local function, so that the source of authorization cannot be made the dividing line between those cases for which the
state as a whole should be liable, and those for which the local
unit should be liable. Larger cities and the more populous counties could perhaps bear the burdens of mistakes made in their
behalf, but in the case of the small cities and villages the imposition of liability on the unit is not very much more effective than
spreading the loss over a few personal sureties, or a surety company, in addition to the officer.
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In addition to the problem of dividing responsibility in the
states there is the question of the type of tribunal which shall be
used to handle these cases. The elimination of the jury is a first
requisite, because, in the light of the experience in the case of
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 9 the states or other governmental units
could not be expected to consent to having cases against them
tried before juries in this branch of the law. These cases might
be provided for in some more comprehensive scheme of government liability in tort, with special tribunals, such as courts of
claims, for the settlement of such disputes.
Should there first be a trial against the officer, and then the
officer in turn sue the state or other responsible unit? Or should
the entire matter be settled in one claim, with the governmental
unit represented by counsel in the suit against the officer? If the
latter method were adopted the suit would probably be in one of
the regular courts of the established judicial system of the state
instead of in a court of claims. These are some of the problems
which would have to be solved in any proposal looking to government responsibility for acts of officers under unconstitutional statutes. Perhaps the most important step to be taken is that involved
in the establishment of some regular systematic administration of
these and other tort cases, wherein the government is for one
reason or another the party defendant. With that step taken,
experimentation with limited jurisdictioi as to the size of claims
to be entertained, the retention of legislative control over the cases
involving larger amounts than those entrusted to the tribunal, and
the single trial of a case to establish liability, may not be so costly
but that the advantages to be gained thereby will far outweigh
remote possibilities of raids on the public treasury.
The practice of foreign countries in dealing with government
responsibility is suggestive, but it is only analogous because action
under an unconstitutional statute does not occur in many countries
other than the United States. Such action differs from the ordinary case of tort on the part of the officer, because he acts in
accordance with a statute or ordinance, and in reliance thereon.
The practice which obtains in some foreign countries of compen"SuPra note 88.
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sating for injury due to the operation of government regardless
of whether such injury constitutes a tort or not is more nearly
analogous to the responsibility here proposed for action under invalid statutes than is the practice with respect to responsibility in
tort. There is likely to be some injury and loss occasioned by the
normal routine operation of any enterprise conducted on such a
large scale as government, in its governmental as well as in its private activities. For these the citizen should not be compelled to pay
directly,'if the loss should in a given case fall upon him, but should
only be compelled to pay indirectly, through contribution to the
common fund, which should be provided for by legislation. Unconstitutional statutes will continue to be enacted. Injury will
continue to be done under them. The group instead of the individual should take up the loss, and that irrespective of whether the
injury would constitute a technical tort or not.

